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Abstract 
The article focuses on the dominant understanding of law as being a pure, sealed discipline, 
normative, professionalized and institutionalized character. It challenges this view against the background of comparative 
legal studies and, in particular, from the perspective of the culturalist periphery which deploys an alternative epistemology 
leading to a complex understanding. Culturalism includes interdisciplinarity as a principle of its agenda, arguing that 
philosophy is part of law. The article analyses the need for philosophy within such a context, records the ways in which 
philosophy is used, offers an overview of the recurrent philosophical themes and philosophers and concludes on the dangers 
of such an enterprise.  
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1. Law as closed 
 usually refers to an epistemological perspective that first creates its own object and 
then poses the convenient explanations,  would rather connote the strategies of power that 
assert the limits of the field and establishes the hierarchies inside it [1], disciplinarity concerning the connection 
between knowledge and power [2]. 
Law as a field (or for that matter, a discipline) is particu ], to the extent that one 
could meaningfully ask whether lawyers see philosophers at all or whether they rather live in hopeless epistemic 
blindness. In fact, will philosophy always be but a footnote reference or a marginal comment in some (not even in 
all) legal books? Is there a gap between law non-  forms of knowledge, including the 
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philosophy of law? Is the philosophical subtext relevant only for the peripherical, disobedient and subversive 
lawyer? 
racter. As it is meant to regulate 
society in general  but also a specific society, with unique, irreducible features  law belongs to tradition (also to 
a certain tradition, be it a national, a regional or to a certain extent a globalized  one); or tradition is considered 
to be static, stable and inexorable. Equally, law should remain relatively uncomplicated, since (interdisciplinary) 
complications generate uncertainty, while uncertainty is detrimental to predictability and ultimately to the rule of 
law [3]. Indeed, in accordance with the authority paradigm within which they operate, lawyers may well criticize 
the legal text both from the point of view of its contents or form, as well as with respect to the social effects that 
it is supposed to generate, but they cannot deny its character of being law [3]. Furthermore, if it is true that each 
é doctrinale, which exercises its control on the legal 
meaning, but also on the legal profession, for the purpose of avoiding distortions and excluding contradictions 
[4]. 
But the opacity that the legal field has developed with respect to most of the other -
also due to at least two more facts. -sufficiency or self-claimed 
supremacy. Indeed, la -eminence in respect to 
intimate statement of faith. As it has been pointed out, within the continental European nomothetical tradition, 
law is (and represents the study of) the legal text (la loi), which itself is traditionally sacred [5;6]. Therefore, out 
 [7] law has to remain pure.  
]. 
The general context of the 20th century, the science century by excellence, forced lawyers to apply to the law, the 
object of their study, scientific values such as truth, certainty, rationality, neutrality, objectivity or hypotheses 
testability. Within law, the scientific general paradigm has thus generated a discourse tending to rationalize, 
structure and systematize reality, for the purpose of conferring it an appearance acceptable from the widely 
adopted scientific point of view, thus granting law meaning and value. In other words, in order to be perceived as 
a respectable cognitive approach, the legal science itself has had to promote the attributes of the pure positive 
sciences, recreating law according to an aesthetized pattern, focusing on systemicity, generality and predictable 
regularities.   
Traditionally, what matters for lawyers is that the binding law within one jurisdiction should be described 
without distortion. Coherent with the general positivist scientific trend of the 20th century, such an approach will 
naturally and conveniently emphasize on the strictly conceptual, systematic, logical, neutrally articulated and 
objectively assessable dimensions of law. Within such perspectives, the hermetic character of the legal field can 
be said to represent an attempt to express the desire of scientific respectability of the field, which has gradually 
become an epistemological mark thereof. 
 
and professionalization have turned the legal knowledge ].  
2. Need for philosophy 
The shortcomings of the orthodox perspective about law have become obvious within a particular discipline of 
the field: comparative legal studies. As such, the legal comparative reflection depends on the encounter of 
different national legal systems, which allows the emergence of cultural elements. Obviously, such a presence 
connotes a potential manifestation of the non-legal, unusual and uncomfortable for the classic lawyer. Unlike the 
classical legal discourse, the comparative law discourse is permissive to the non-legal dimension of law and 
opens to other fields of knowledge, also providing explanatory models that can highly differ from the strictly 
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le
[7], the overpassing of the local dimension meaning at the same time the transgressing of the strict, parochial, 
normativity. Relevantly, the emancipatory move out of the strictly legal model will be a never-ending odyssey, as 
7], particularly 
7]. As it 
, 
7]. 
From the perspective of the legal comparison as sub-discipline of the legal field, a strong intellectual 
] has been therefore pointed out, generated by the lack of any explanatory dimension of the 
ind [8]. 
Philosophy has been deemed of outmost importance in order to prevent the risk of a possible contamination of 
the promising comparative legal studies with the epistemological disease of the general field, since, 
parad
[8]. 
Also  but for quite opposite reasons  philosophy can offer meaningful insights into the (rare) hypothesis of 
[10]. In the same line, philosophy can constitute a supplement in understanding basic legal topics (such as 
-
[1
meaningful answer to such questions can be offered witho  
ledge, better suited to the poli-vocality 
and equivocality characteristic of cross- 8]. 
3. How to use philosophy? 
Onc
different ways. 
attempt to disobey the established rules of the classical legal paradigm and especially to subvert the golden 
principle of purism in law. Thus, interdisciplinarity as a principle of the new approach to law is justified by the 
 philosophical theories supposed to illustrate the poverty of the 
reflection in the classic legal paradigm. The philosophy of language has been therefore evoked in order to show 
the need for a linguistic insight when dealing with legal traditions in which law is expressed in different 
languages. Such an example could be the issue of multilingualism within the European Union or the one of 
legislative bilingualism in Canada [1]. In the same way, the various philosophical explanatory patterns of the 
relationship between world, language and truth- and also, in particular, the theories about fiction  have been 
discussed when dealing with the epistemological constraints of the comparative law analysis in general [11]. 
Even more frequently and more constantly, hermeneutics have been used to support the idea that the classical 
unequivocal relationship between the lawyer and law as an exterior object should be questioned within the field 
of legal comparison [1;7;12]. 
At its best, the pattern of the emancipatory interdisciplinary approach to (comparative) law from the 
perspective of philosophy would be the following: a topic is selected that presents relevance for the field, in the 
12], such as the question whether comparative law should be reduced to a 
method. Like several other topics, this one has generated a centric (orthodox) opinion and largely marginal views. 
Predictably, the well-established perspective lacks any serious background of consideration and, therefore, fails 
to offer a coherent answer to fundamental questions belonging to the ontology of comparative law itself, such as, 
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12]. At 
 topic is introduced from a critical philosophical standpoint. In 
backgrounds and representing particular strands of philosophical thought in order t 12]. 
12]. The fact that the insights of the philosophers chosen are 
contradictory on a number of points is irrelevant, as far as there is one main point of agreement, namely that 
12]. Once again, in this first hypothesis, the 
recourse to philosophy is animat   12] of 
the concept at stake, urging comparatists to admit the relativity of their epistemological presuppositions. 
(2) In almost the same line, but this time within a systematic approach, philosophy is used as a tool deepening 
the understanding of the key issues arising in legal comparison. For this purpose, comparatists would map the 
field, identifying the focal points thereof (which will also function as elements of division between the orthodox 
and the contracentric understanding of comparative law). Such relevant e
.  
Deploying a genuine interdisciplinary analysis, an eminent comparatist has traced the possible origin of the 
orthodox axi
7]. 
7] are inscribed within the 
 or the lack of positioning 
7]. 
Apart from such polarization
7]. Indeed, philosophy shows that, as a response to the Sophists, Plato and 
Aristotle moved the criterion of discursive validity from the absence of self-contradiction to the principle of 
 
Similarly, the concept of objectivity is addressed from a philosophical perspective in order to question the 
basic assumption prevailing in the orthodox approach to comparative law which 
7]. The interdisciplinary analysis reveals the philosophical background of one particular 
epoch  namely the late 18th century  to argue that objectivity as advanced by orthodox comparatists is neither a 
transcendal nor an unproblematic notion. Indeed, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, perhaps the most influential 
European legal comparat
analyzing such use of the notion will in fact first 
to secondly identify their connections with moral philosophy and collaborative science. The works of David 
Hume, Adam Smith or Imannuel Kant, mainly devaluating prejudices, perspectival apprehension or the 
judgment, are connected with the needs of the early 19th century newly emerging scientific 
community within which communicability became an intrinsic value, triggering the imperative of neutrality. The 
conclusion drawn from the philosophical background is that contrary to what mainstream comparatists may think, 
 
  7]. Such a conclusion allows the comparatist 
- 7]. Indeed, given 
 itself, any appeal to the concept as a means of establishing a hierarchy between 
7]. 
As one may easily notice, the dismantling of a legal notion such as  with the tools of 
philosophy has in these particular instances not only offered a better understanding thereof, but it has also 
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relativised their orthodox uses and, paradoxically, recuperated them within the framework of the disobedient 
comparative law periphery.  
(3) At an even more general and programmatic level, perhaps, philosophy as such may offer an explanatory 
framework for the cleavage between the classical (comparative) legal science and the contracentric lawyers at 
more than one level. Thus, Pierre Legrand has organized the comparative legal field in the orthodox center and 
the various peripheries and developed a theory showing that since the centre may have as an emblematic figure 
the philosophy of Descartes, the peripheral legal research is haunted by Derrida [13]. Within this framework, the 
centre is identified with one allegedly sacred book [14], which is analyzed according to a threefold pattern: what 
it says, what it means, the Cartesian allegiance of the meaning. Literally, the 
13] and, in order to make 
will be deployed he 
[13] the author suspends the classical 
law is, that does not see it as isolated, but as always-already engaged within the tradition and culture from which 
-other-in-law that is historical and epistemological, political and 
 
[13] to t
a philosopher, 
 of the law and, as such, is li [13]. 
However, the Derridian philosophy should be examined within the comparative law research, at least because 
  realm, partakes in 
law, not, of course, in the normative sense (it cannot identify the posited law), but in what one might call the 
constitutive sense [13
focusing on aspects [13]. Thus, as we will see 
further on, the whole new paradigm of comparative legal studies is organized according to principles stated in 
accordance with the Derridian thought and in opposition with the Cartesian line of thinking. 
(4) Within a genuine interdisciplinary approach, sometimes the text of the legal comparison directly refers to 
-at-law, then, the 
aim is to refuse to take statutes or judicial decisions as so many givens and, through an unceasing movement of 
oscillation towards and away from the posited, something like a Heideggerian Verwindung, to try to see how 
these law-texts are conditioned and shaped by contingent epistemological patterns directed to values  and also 
7]. 
 Similarly, sets of philosophical arguments may be applied to law for the purpose of theorizing either concepts 
or main principles relevant for the comparative law analysis. 
cannot be perfectly similar, to exist is to differ,
differential comparison  
7
7].  
rence to a word by its 
 Pierre Legrand defends the point that, as far as comparatists-at-
about foreign law is uttered by a comparatist, indeed by this or that comparatist  idea kept both in philosophy 
7].     
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(5) Sometimes again, philosophy can be used as a reading guide. The abstract of a text belonging to the legal 
comparatist must be read as formulating an 
10]. The same idea is 
 presence from the beginning to 
s the 
10]. One can obviously ask the question of the 
neither indicated in the text, 
from first to last, the parallel might be reasonably drawn. 
Rosenfeld wishes to circumvent, the pressure of which he wants to resist, as he engages in a covert discussion 
10]. 
(6) There is also a discrete and implicit use of philosophy that may reasonably be interpreted as a sign that the 
most genuine form of interdisciplinarity has been put into practice within the comparative legal text. Thus, while 
 Pierre Legrand notices, without much emphasis within the general economy of 
7]. The remark 
focuses on the inherent performative character of all conceptual tools used by lawyers within the economy of 
 
(7) Lastly, in a fusional type of approach, philosophy  or at least some philosophical concepts or ideas  
could turn into a textual practice to be constantly deployed by the lawyer who will irreversibly open its discourse 
to interdisciplinarity, as philosophy becomes the canvas exhibiting law, decrypting it and supplementing its 
matters and as 
regards the self/other dynamics are worthy of serious consideration, and may deserve to be received as theoretical 
investiga -
8]. For an example of such an approach, the comparatist organizes his discourse 
rridian] key clusters of i  whose relevance to law will afterwards be proven through an 
- rather than within the classic paradigm [8]. Among these 
main concepts are considered to be those of Surface, Presence, Spectrality and Trace, Unconcealment, 
Obliquation, Differance, Double Bind or Invagination as Justice. These theoretical commitments will help the 
 
haunting the law-text through infinitely complex networks of enmeshment  and therefore partaking of it as law-
8]. A French statute and a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada will indeed offer the opportunity to 
turn the philosophical concepts into units of the comparative practice [7]. Such praxis shows beyond doubt that 
the two pieces of law analyzed are constituted by arrays of traces haunting them and that each such trace is 
traceable to a further one so that no absolute origin of meaning can be justified [7]. The interpretation of the two 
foreign legal units once in co-presence is provisional and differed [7]. The same reasoning is applied to an 
institution of the type currently appreciated by positivists, that of the injunction stipulated by article 1184 (3) of 
the French civil code and its imperative that termination of contract should be requested in a court of law. Even 
such an anodyne institution that would be approached by the mainstream positivism descriptively for the unique 
purpose to assess how the French courts have interpreted its legal key words is in fact traceable and thus 
redeemed in the culturalist perspective. Indeed, article 1184 (3) of the French civil code is but a vector of various 
ular, of French legal culture  such as a strong assertive state, a 
well-honed social demand for state intervention, the deep distrust into which the individual is readily held, a 
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time honored aversion for the unfettered play of the market and the related assumption that only the state can 
7]. 
4. Which themes? Which philosophers? 
The newly-discovered interest for and relevance of philosophy triggers the presence in the (comparative) legal 
doctrinal discourse of unexpected themes such as truth  authenticity  plausibility; ethnocentricity/otherness; the 
general topic of the relationship between self and other; the current issues linked to texts  textuality  text 
interpretation; the concern for the epistemological constraints of the comparison; the unavoidable limits of the 
understanding; the general need for hermeneutics within the comparative law analysis; the relationship between 
world and words. 
A non-exhaustive list of the main names of philosophers deemed relevant for the legal analysis within the new 
paradigm will include Jacques Derrida, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Alain Badiou, 
Michel Foucault, Willard Quine, but also John Austin, Peter Strawson, John Searle, Charles Pierce. The basic 
points of interest in philosophy seem, therefore, to be ontology, but also hermeneutics and the analytic 
philosophy tradition or the philosophy of language. As the new legal paradigm constitutes itself as a reaction to 
the established authority in the centre of the field, it is not surprising that deconstruction, originally a form of 
 
5. Which dangers? 
Unexpectedly domiciled within the legal field, interdisciplinarity will allow addressing questions generated by 
the interaction between heterogeneous disciplines.  
Among those, the deepest concern of interdisciplinarity is probably the blurring of the genuine meaning 
imported product will always have the form of its appropriation rather than the form it exhibits at home;  it 
will already be marked 9]. This remark is particularly accurate with law, a 
field that has developed schemes of intelligibility meant to preserve its purity and to prevent it to connect. 
Interdisciplinarity could in such a context only de-center the legal knowledge, without however re-disciplinizing 
in the beginning there was law. Then came law- 15] captures faithfully the 
problem: law may well be injected with interdisciplinary knowledge, the extraneous units remain but irritants to 
the field that annexes them without genuinely reevaluating its a priori.  
This is not, however, the culturalist agenda, which seeks for meaningful polyphonic comparison. Ultimately, 
philosophy will re-signify comparative law in the deepest sense of the word. Indeed, philosophy is neither 
epistemological appreciation, the different discourses that have classically been said to lie outside of the law are 
recorded, or re- 7]. 
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